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Abstract 
 
What is virtue? Advancing the conceptualization of virtue to inform positive organizational 
inquiry 
In order to advance theory, key concepts need to be clearly defined  (e.g. Kozlowski & Klein, 
2000; Suddaby, 2010). Scholars in the field of positive organizational inquiry are engaging in 
meaningful work on the processes, practices, and attributes which enable optimal human and 
organizational functioning. Much of this work incorporates the concept of virtue as an 
integral part of positive organizing. However, we argue that the efficacy of this scholarship is 
undermined by poorly defined and misconstrued conceptualizations of virtue, which vary 
widely in their scope and perspective (Gotsis & Grimani, 2015). This article draws on the 
philosophy of Aristotelian virtue ethics and the deep ontological framework of critical 
realism to articulate a clear definition of virtue, and a five factor framework for determining 
what is virtuous in which contexts. These contributions provide the foundation for a stronger 
virtue-based perspective in positive organizational inquiry.  
 
Key words 
Management education and development, Management Spirituality and Religion, Organizational 
behaviour, Ethics and codes of conduct, Social Issues in Management, Organizational Development 
and Change  
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Introduction  
Robust theory cannot be built on a shaky foundation; and a foundation of poorly articulated 
constructs will always be shaky. Building good theory starts with clearly defined concepts 
(e.g. Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Suddaby, 2010). The rapidly growing field of positive 
organizational inquiry (POI) pursues the understanding of positive processes, outcomes, 
attributes, and behaviors within organizational contexts (e.g. Cameron, Quinn, & Dutton, 
2003; Cameron & Spreitzer, 2012). Although virtue is often cited as central to these worthy 
pursuits, the concept of virtue is not clearly articulated within the field of POI. For example,  
virtue is sometimes conceptualized as discrete individual-level virtues such as humility, 
courage, compassion, or integrity (Cameron & Spreitzer, 2012); and other times as macro 
level constructs such as organizational virtue (Heugens, Kaptein, & van Oosterhout, 2008), 
organizational virtuousness (Cameron, 2003) or organizational environmental virtuousness 
(Sadler-Smith, 2013). Furthermore, individual-level virtues have been positioned as both 
stable traits (e.g. Alzola, 2012; Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman, 2005), and as fluid, 
changeable states (e.g. Dutton, Roberts, & Bednar, 2010; Sison, Hartman, & Fontrodona, 
2012; Weaver, 2006). Thus, while the concept of virtue is generally understood to relate to 
goodness or excellence, the lack of clarity regarding what virtue actually is ultimately hinders 
the advancement of virtue-based theory within POI and the contribution the field can make to 
management research and practice.   
Therefore, this article aims to provide clarity to the notion of virtue as it applies to the 
field of POI. To do this, we will draw on the philosophies of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics (AVE) 
and critical realism. Specifically, we will discuss how the work of Aristotle and numerous 
virtue ethicists that have followed (e.g. Alzola, 2012; Audi, 2012; Beadle, Sison, & 
Fontrodona, 2015; Fontrodona, Sison, & Bruin, 2013; MacIntyre, 1999; Solomon, 1993), can 
provide depth to our understanding of virtue. Furthermore, we will integrate a critical realist 
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lens to provide a deep ontology that allows us to clearly articulate the emergent qualities of 
virtue in a way that captures the depth of AVE while remaining tangible enough to enable 
further theorizing and empirical investigation within the socially scientific field of POI.  
In the sections that follow, we will first review the value of virtue in organizational 
scholarship, before exploring some problems with the current conceptualization of virtue 
within POI.  We then define virtue and illustrate a deep ontology to make sense of the 
difference yet interrelatedness of virtue and virtues. Following which we explicate some key 
features of virtue, and make clear distinctions between virtue and other seemingly similar 
concepts, including values, corporate social responsibility and organizational citizenship 
behaviors. Lastly, we present our five-factor framework for determining what is virtuous and 
in which contexts. This framework is not intended as a mechanism for generating a list of 
virtues. Rather, we position the framework as a model that can be adopted by researchers and 
practitioners to determine what is virtuous, within specific organizational contexts. In doing 
so, we respond to Suddaby’s (2010) call to provide sharp distinctions around the defined 
concept (virtue) so that it might be distilled as an understandable category. In undertaking 
these functions, this article provides clarity to the concept of virtue so that it might provide a 
solid foundation for the advancement of a virtue perspective and the refinement of virtue-
based theories within the field of POI.  
The value of virtue in organizational scholarship 
Much has changed in the millennia since Aristotle philosophized about the nature of human 
character and organized human activity – but as humans, we continue to engage in organized 
activity, and we still look to those around us to provide moral direction and meaning to our 
lives. Increasingly, our workplaces have become our contexts for identity construction 
(Dutton et al., 2010), our frameworks for moral and ethical conduct (Fehr, Kai Chi, & Dang, 
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2015), and where we look for meaning, belonging, and opportunities to flourish (Baumeister 
& Leary, 1995; Michaelson, Pratt, Grant, & Dunn, 2014). Today, our polis is our workplace; 
our identities are derived less by who we are and what tribe we come from, and more by 
‘what we do’ and where we work. However, while we look for meaning, purpose and the 
conditions to flourish in our organizations, all too often, we do not find them. Many 
organizations fall short in providing the experience of community that is so essential to our 
wellbeing. 
This is a complex problem with symptoms manifest at every level of organizations 
and evidenced in popular press, with a multitude of best-selling business books and blogs, 
management texts, and academic literatures on topics such as presenteeism (e.g. Johns, 2009), 
engagement (e.g. Macey & Schneide, 2008; Saks, 2006), employee turnover (e.g. Griffeth, 
Hom, & Gaertner, 2000), ethical and unethical leadership and behavior (e.g. Brown & 
Mitchell, 2010; Wart, 2014), and incivility, including discrimination, bullying, and 
harassment (e.g. Anderson & Pearson, 1999; Branch, Ramsay, & Barker, 2012). While most 
of these publications provide some sort of explanation or suggested solution to its issue of 
focus, the underlying problem of a disparity between the meaningful human community 
members desire and the modern organizations we have remains. Despite the complexity and 
contemporary emergence of this problem, we suggest virtue, as understood within the ancient 
field of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics (AVE), is the answer 
Virtue is the core of AVE and has been a topic of philosophical inquiry for millennia. 
Put simply, virtue is the ‘goodness part of us’; the essence of moral character. Virtue is also 
the linchpin between individuals and groups, and the enabler of eudemonia or flourishing and 
meaningful community. At the individual, group, and organizational level, virtue offers the 
potential to address the negative consequences resulting from the mismatch between the 
communities we desire and the organizations we have. The philosophy of virtue offers not 
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only a remedy to the symptoms of the problem (e.g. turnover, presenteeism, bullying, 
incivility, or failings of leadership) – but an answer to the underlying problem itself. 
Organizations are communities based on human relationships in which individuals are “given 
a context in which to be meaningful” (Solomon, 1993, p. 84).   We suggest is that a well-
informed virtue perspective might enable us to better understand how to create meaningful 
human connection and belonging within our organizations. 
The majority of management scholarship focuses on cognitive, behavioral, and 
affective phenomena and understanding. But, what about the very essence of humanness? 
What about the soul Aristotle spoke of? What about our uniquely human desire to do good 
and live communally with others? Where does this essence fall within the triad of cognition, 
behavior, and emotion? In this paper we argue that failing to recognize this ethereal, 
intangible, uniquely human quality may be one explanation for why many organizations fail 
to provide the meaningful human connection members desire. Adopting a virtue perspective, 
both within scholarship and practice, may allow us to more effectively understand the 
goodness part of us; the essence of moral character; the pursuit of eudemonia and how to 
activate the linchpin between individuals and groups so as to create organizations that 
provide the meaning, belonging, and connection so desired by members.  
However, in order to advance a virtue perspective, we must be clear about what we 
mean by virtue. Since the time of the Ancient Greeks, the notion of virtue has experienced 
periods of banishment and a somewhat tarnished reputation. The terms ‘virtue’ and ‘virtues’ 
can carry connotations of religion, dogma, extreme conservatism, and an irrelevance to 
science. Reluctance to speak of virtue has been linked to the social-political separation of 
church and state, a dominant feature of many western societies which perhaps unfairly, 
assigned topics of virtue and morality to the domains of faith and religion, and thus ‘off limits’ 
to the study of organizations (Manz, Marx, Neal, & Manz, 2006).  
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Compounding the reluctance to speak of virtue is the fact that within academic 
dialogues, the topic remains conceptually unclear. Virtue is rooted in the Latin word virtus, 
meaning strength or excellence. It is widely acknowledged that virtues pertain to moral 
goodness; are the elements of moral character; have a positive human impact; and promote 
social betterment (Cameron, Bright, & Caza, 2004). However, like other complex and 
malleable concepts within the social sciences, the concept of virtue does not have a single 
universally agreed upon definition (Luthans & Youssef, 2008).  
Meaningful communication between scholars and the accumulation of knowledge 
depends on clear constructs; clear constructs are the basis of “improving the  relevance and 
rigor of organizational research” (Suddaby, 2010, p. 356). Without clarification of exactly 
what virtue is, advancement of a virtue perspective and our ability to address the problem 
underlying myriad symptoms plaguing our organizations – is limited. Hence, our undertaking 
in this article to clearly articulate the concept of virtue so that it can be applied within 
organizational scholarship.   
Problems with how virtue is currently conceptualized  
While AVE offers a rich understanding of virtue, we propose POI is better suited to 
operationalizing, measuring, and possibly developing virtue in organizations. POI is an 
umbrella approach that covers the distinct fields of Positive Organizational Psychology, 
Positive Organizational Scholarship, and Positive Organizational Behavior. A cursory survey 
of POI literatures reveals frequent references to the importance of virtue (Alzola, 2012), 
virtues (Peterson & Seligman, 2004), virtuous (Cameron, 2013), and organizational 
virtuousness (Bright, Cameron, & Caza, 2006; Cameron, 2003). POI, in a somewhat fractured 
way, seeks to measure and develop virtue – but there remains a lack of clarity within the POI 
literature regarding the meaning of virtue, a gap that we suggest can be addressed by drawing 
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on the philosophical depth of AVE. The  lack of clarity regarding the notion of virtue within 
the field of POI is evidenced by loose definitions of virtue or instances where an 
understanding of virtue is seemingly assumed and no definition provided, as well various 
conflicting lists of  ‘the’ virtues (e.g. Hackett & Wang, 2012; Solomon, 1992; Wärnå-Furu, 
Sääksjärvi, & Santavirta, 2010).  
Using a deep ontology allows us to provide clarity to the concept of virtue, and the 
distinct yet interrelated concepts of virtues, virtuous, and virtuousness. Providing conceptual 
clarity also answers a fundamental critique of POI; a lack of serious explorations of the 
conceptual basis of key terms (Hackman, 2009). The centrality of virtue to POI has become 
increasingly explicit since Hackman’s (2009) critique, yet there remains a lack of consensus 
or clarity around the notion. Currently virtues are conceptualized as both individual and 
organizational phenomena. At the individual level, virtues are used as descriptive attributes 
(Whetstone, 2003), informing of moral agency and self-concept (Weaver, 2006), and 
elemental traits of character (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). And virtues are simultaneously 
applied as organizational level phenomena such as organizational forgiveness, organizational 
trust, and organizational integrity (Cameron et al., 2004; Williams, Kern, & Waters, 2015). 
Similarly, virtuousness is sometimes applied to individuals, and sometimes to organizations.  
Another example of conceptual confusion is the frequent blurring of the inherency 
versus instrumentality of virtue, with projects emerging which claim to harness virtue to 
increase business growth (Dokes, 2017) and performance (Donada, Mothe, Nogatchewsky, & 
de Campos Ribeiro, 2017), whereas others argue for the inherent value of virtue, that virtue is 
good for its own sake (e.g. Bright et al., 2006; Cameron, 2011, 2013). The application of 
virtue, virtues, and virtuousness varies widely in scope and perspective (Gotsis & Grimani, 
2015). We do not intend to discredit previous work or theories of virtue; much excellent 
research has been produced. However, we do suggest it is time for a more unified 
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conceptualization of virtue so that our collective efforts might build more meaningfully upon 
one another.  
Defining virtue  
When discussing virtue, authors frequently cite its Greek origins and general implications of 
rightness, goodness, and excellence without providing an explicit, coherent definition of what 
exactly virtue is. For instance, some suggest virtue is a practice (Whetstone, 2003), while 
others explain it as consisting of moral perception, emotion, belief and reasoning, and 
motivation (Curren & Kotzee, 2014). Virtue is often conceptualized as an excellence, such as 
“an exemplary way of getting along with other people, a way of manifesting in one's own 
thoughts, feelings and actions the ideals and aims of the entire community” (Solomon, 1992, 
p. 331). Virtue is also characterized as right or good. For instance, virtue is feeling and acting 
“at the right times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the 
right way…” (Sison & Ferrero, 2015, p. S84). Frequently, virtue is investigated as one or 
more distinct virtues such as forgiveness (Bright & Exline, 2012; Fehr & Gelfand, 2012), 
compassion (Dutton & Workman, 2011; Lilus, Kanov, Dutton, Worline, & Maitlis, 2012), or 
hope (Rego, Sousa, Marques, & Pina e Cunha, 2014).  
A well-constructed definition consists of a differentia plus a genus; what ‘it’ is a part 
of, and by what ‘it’ is set apart (Locke, 2012). Suddaby (2010) explains that “clear constructs 
are simply robust categories that distil phenomena into sharp distinctions that are 
comprehensible to a community of researchers – that is, animal, mineral, or vegetables; gas, 
liquid, or solid” (p. 346). A definition of virtue needs to acknowledge that it is a construct 
composed of discrete virtues. Thus, we define virtue according to Locke’s (2012) 
requirements, and use the three layered ontology of critical realism to illustrate how our 
definition cascades to the related terms of virtues, virtuous, and virtuousness. In doing so, we 
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address Suddaby’s (2010) call to provide sharp distinctions to the construct of virtue by 
outlining a five factor framework to determine what is virtuous in which contexts.  
A definition of virtue must capture its internal essence, as intent, inclination, or desire, 
as well as its manifestation in thought, emotion, and action (Sison & Ferrero, 2015), as will 
be discussed in more detail below. Virtues are also innately human. We therefore suggest that 
the genus of virtue is human quality, and that its differentia is positive moral orientation, 
good, or excellence. Therefore, we define virtue as the human inclination to feel, think, and 
act in ways that express moral excellence and contribute to the common good. 
The fields of AVE and POI are related, but distinct. A primary distinction between 
them is how they treat the notion of virtue. POI primarily treats virtues as desirable qualities 
of character, while AVE recognizes that virtue is also expressed and developed in actions, 
habits, character, and lifestyle (Aristotle, 350BCE/1962; Sison & Ferrero, 2015). The 
compatibility of the two fields has been debated by a number of recent works (e.g. Beadle et 
al., 2015; David Bright, Winn, & Kanov, 2014; Sison & Ferrero, 2015). In brief, virtue 
ethicists tend to suggest that the positive paradigms over simplify the notion of virtue and 
reduce a rich notion to observable behaviors (Beadle et al., 2015). In contrast, from a positive 
social scientific stance, the idea of virtue put forward by virtue ethicists appears deeply 
complex and troublesome to conceptualize, operationalize, and measure. POI tends to regard 
virtue as character traits, with empirical investigation often focusing on one or two specific 
virtues, such as forgiveness (e.g. Bright & Exline, 2012; Fehr & Gelfand, 2012) or 
compassion (e.g. Dutton & Workman, 2011; Dutton, Worline, Frost, & Lilius, 2006). This 
approach allows for a more manageable way of bounding and measuring antecedents and 
outcomes in the traditionally scientific ways.  
But AVE digs deeper:  
“A virtuous character comes from the cultivation of virtuous habits. However, 
virtuous habits themselves result from the repeated performance of virtuous actions, 
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and virtuous actions, in turn arise from one’s having nurtured virtuous inclinations or 
tendencies. Virtuous inclinations and tendencies are precisely those that are in 
accordance with human nature and its final end” (Sison & Ferrero, 2015, p. S81).  
This nested notion of virtue, as emerging from inclination and eventuating in virtuous 
character represents a deeper, richer understanding of virtue. It echoes Aristotle’s sentiment 
that human nature is communal and rational, and that our final end is eudemonic wellbeing, 
or meaningful happiness.  
We do not intend to reconcile these two robust fields. Rather, we aim to use a 
conventional western approach to AVE to provide richness, depth, and clarity to our 
understanding of virtue within the field of POI. As we will demonstrate, using the ontology 
of critical realism allows us to bridge the gap between philosophy and socially scientific 
inquiry by clarifying virtue in a way that acknowledges the richness and depth of AVE while 
simultaneously providing a framework for operationalizing and measuring virtuous behavior 
within POI. We are intentionally walking a fine line; attempting to provide clarity to the 
notion of virtue so that it can be understood and applied within POI while also retaining the 
richness inherited from AVE. We do not seek to define virtue in a way that will ultimately 
satisfy virtue ethicists. Instead, we seek to clarify and enrich our understanding of virtue 
within POI by drawing on the AVE tradition to provide a solid foundation for the 
advancement of a virtue perspective and the refining of virtue-based theory and empirical 
investigation.  To capture the evolutionary nature of individual virtue and to illustrate the 
interrelatedness between our definition of virtue and individual virtues, virtuous, and 
virtuousness, we draw on the deep ontology of critical realism. 
Using a deep ontology make sense of virtue and virtues 
Critical realism articulates three layers of reality: the empirical, the actual, and the real 
(Edwards, O'Mahoney, & Vincent, 2014). We use these layers of reality to explain the 
distinction between virtue, and virtues, virtuous, and virtuousness in a way that acknowledges 
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the emergent qualities articulated by Sison and Ferrero (2015). The empirical domain reflects 
the subjective experience, things individuals hear, see, smell, touch, and taste. The domain of 
the actual is the domain of events; interactions and happenings that give rise to subjective 
experiences which are heard, seen, smelt, felt, and tasted. Below the domain of the actual is 
the domain of the real. The domain of the real is comprised of causal structures and 
generative mechanisms which give rise to events, which are then experienced subjectively 
(Edwards et al., 2014).  
As shown in Figure 1, the deep ontology of critical realism illustrates that there is 
‘truth’ but that ‘truth’ is that which gives rise to events and experiences. What we see and 
think may or may not be ‘true’, but what gives rise to what we see and think is true – truth is 
in the potential to have impact; those processes and mechanisms that churn away, often 
unseen, and give rise to life as we experience it (Edwards et al., 2014; Fleetwood, 2005).  
Drawing on this layered ontology, we position virtue in the domain of the real. Virtue, 
we propose, is an internal locus; a fundamentally good human quality, intent, or inclination 
(Beadle et al., 2015; Sison & Ferrero, 2015). It is not seen in–itself but in its manifestation 
through thoughts feeling and actions and as expressed in behavioral events. That is, we 
suggest virtue is a generative mechanism; virtue has causal efficacy (Fleetwood, 2005)  
which gives rise to virtues. Virtues constitute thoughts, feelings, and actions that are 
generated by virtue (a fundamentally good quality, intent, or inclination). Virtues arise out of 
virtue and reside in the actual domain. Virtues are expressed and enacted as behavioral events. 
Events are then experienced subjectively in the empirical domain and made sense of as 
expressions of virtuous behavior or virtuousness.  
------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------- 
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We will use an example to illustrate. Imagine three people in a room discussing a 
project. Individual A, with fundamentally good intention or inclination, voices a concern 
about the project. Individual B regards the raising of the concern as an expression of wisdom; 
the concern is valid and points towards a better approach to the project. Individual C, 
however, regards the raising of the concern as courageous – doing so could cause a backlash, 
but the individual did so anyway. Individual A’s good inclination is representative of her 
virtue, her internal inclination towards moral excellence. Her virtue is the mechanism that 
generates the behavioral event by which she voices her concern. Thus, this event is 
experienced and interpreted subjectively by individual B and individual C as two different 
virtues; one individual makes sense of the behavior as wisdom, the other as courage. 
Courage well illustrates how Aristotle characterized virtue as the golden mean 
between two vices. According to Aristotle’s ‘golden mean’, courage represents the virtuous 
mean between cowardice and rashness. We would suggest that this iconic Aristotelian 
teaching compliments our layered ontology as above; the process of inclination giving rise to 
actions, which are then experienced. While Aristotle’s description of the golden mean is 
intuitive – we suggest there are more factors that condition the determination of virtue and 
virtuous action. For instance, an individual may act at the mean between cowardice and 
rashness, but is he actually driven by good intent (indicative of virtuous inclination)? Or is he 
driven by fear or expectation of reward? And, does he act on his virtue knowingly? None of 
these questions are alien to the work of Aristotle (Aristotle, 350BCE/1962), yet all 
complicate the idea of virtue being simply a mean between to vices. Determining what is 
virtuous in which contexts will be discussed further below.  
Using a deep ontology allows us to address what we deem a current weakness of POI. 
If the above scenario were assessed for the specific discrete virtue of creativity or gratitude, 
as is common within the field of POI, the underlying virtue giving rise to the event would 
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have been missed. The scenario does not read as one of gratitude or creativity, and so would 
not have been assessed as either of these discrete virtues. It does however, read as an 
expression of virtue. Broadening our virtue perspective to include a deeper awareness of how 
virtue originates as a mechanism that gives rise to action that is then experienced subjectively 
may open up the field of POI to more comprehensive investigations of virtue within 
organizations.  
Key features of virtue 
Building on our definition of virtue as the inclination to feel, think, and act in ways that 
expresses moral excellence and contribute to the common good we next move to highlight 
four features of virtue. The features have been identified from our review of the western 
virtue ethics literature and the literature within POI that deals explicitly with the notion of 
virtue. The four features are consistent with our proposed definition and serve to deepen our 
understanding of virtue – a rich philosophic term – within the social scientific pursuit of POI. 
The features we outline also support our aim to provide the clarity that will allow for the 
operationalization, measurement, and ultimately the development of virtue within 
organizations.   
First, virtue is inextricably linked with the concept of character. Virtue is the essence 
of human character (Aristotle, 350BCE/1962; Solomon, 1993). The ontology of critical 
realism helps clarify virtue’s place in the domain of the real. Virtue is an internally located 
generative mechanism; an individual’s virtue gives rise to thoughts, feelings, and actions that 
constitute events. Thus, we suggest that virtue is representative of human essence or moral 
character. Virtues then, are the elemental building blocks of good character. Habituated 
practices of virtues such as courage, humility, justice, fairness, and patience builds an 
individual’s moral character  (Aristotle, 350BCE/1962; MacIntyre, 1999; Peterson & Park, 
2006; Sison & Ferrero, 2015).  
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 Second, virtue is learnable. Virtue can be learned with instruction, effort, and practice 
(Aristotle, 350BCE/1962; MacIntyre, 1999). It is widely accepted that “virtues are acquired 
by habituation or repetitive practice” (Arjoon, 2000, p. 162). Furthermore, “virtuous actions 
lead to and inspire more virtuous actions” (Bright et al., 2006, p. 255). By its very nature, 
virtue is good and uplifting for both the actor and the recipient. Virtues, demonstrated 
through behavior, are observable and can give rise to social learning, whereby one individual 
observes, learns, and imitates the behaviors of another (Bandura, 1977). Furthermore, the 
uplifting nature of virtue and virtues can inspire positive affect which in turn results in further 
virtuous acts in a contagion effect  (Bright et al., 2006; Cameron et al., 2004).  
Third, virtue is the universal linchpin between individual and community. Rigorous 
historical analyses reveals that the discrete virtues of justice, humanity, temperance, courage, 
transcendence, and wisdom are shared by all peoples around the world and throughout time 
(Peterson & Seligman, 2004). And, as illustrated by our deep ontology, each of these virtues 
arises from a shared, unitary virtue. Virtue is essential to sustained human community (Park, 
Peterson, & Seligman, 2006; Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Solomon, 1992). Indeed, “…it is 
only through the acquisition and exercise of the virtues that individuals and communities can 
flourish in a specifically human mode” (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 112).  The pursuit of virtue is the 
path to achieving personal nobility, goodness, eudemonia, happiness – in a way that serves 
the common good (Wright & Goodstein, 2007). Not only does the cultivation of virtue enable 
meaningful, flourishing human communities, virtue is also essential to the very survival of 
human communities; we cannot coexist without virtue and the expression of virtues (Peterson 
& Seligman, 2004).  
Fourth, virtue is inherently good but may also have instrumental value. Virtue is good 
for its own sake; the very nature of virtue is its inherent goodness and moral excellence. 
However, as a generative mechanism virtue gives rise to virtuous behaviors, events, and 
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experiences which have instrumental properties. Virtues, have myriad instrumental outcomes, 
from allowing for sustained human community (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) to any number 
of empirically correlated outcomes, including thriving (Spreitzer, Porath, & Gibson, 2012), 
flourishing (Cameron & Spreitzer, 2015; Sison et al., 2012), and ethical behavior and 
decision making (Crossan, Seijts, & Mazutis, 2013; Hackett & Wang, 2012).  While the 
inherency versus instrumentality of virtue gives pause for debate, using a layered ontology to 
illustrate the interrelatedness yet distinctness of virtue and virtues or virtuousness allows us to 
reconcile the debate by demonstrating that while virtue is inherent, virtues and virtuousness 
often have instrumental value; they are both means and ends in themselves.  
Distinguishing virtue from similar constructs  
One of the central criticisms of POI is that it is simply ‘old wine in new bottles’. Hackman 
(2009) suggests that the shift to ‘positive’ organizational studies omits the long tradition of 
organizational behavior (OB) and organizational development (OD) which already dealt with 
a number of positive phenomenon such as internal work motivation, team efficacy, self-
actualization, authentic relationships, job enrichment, transformational leadership, high 
commitment organizations, quality of work life, growth satisfaction, and T-groups. We do not 
dispute Hackman’s (2009) position that the newer positive paradigms espouse constructs akin 
to the old OB and OD paradigms. However, we suggest that the explicit inclusion of virtue 
distinguishes POI from its OB and OD predecessors, and the explicit adoption of a robust 
conceptualization of virtue would further this distinction.  
Hackman (2009) suggests that omitting previous research on positive phenomena 
weakens positive organizational studies, but we argue that the incorporation of virtue makes 
these newer paradigms more meaningful and connects them to a moral imperative. We 
mentioned earlier the hesitation to speak of virtue in modern western organizations. It has 
been further suggested that positive concepts within the fields of OD and OB which 
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ultimately reflect virtuousness and virtuous behavior have been ‘diluted’ and ‘disguised’ with 
other terms, such as quality of work life, job enrichment, corporate social responsibility or 
prosocial behavior (Manz, Adams, Shipper, & Manz, 2011).  
There are, however, some key distinctions between the notion of virtue and similar 
terms. And, as mentioned previously, part good conceptualization is clear distinctions 
between one concept and other concepts (Suddaby, 2010). In practice, questions frequently 
arise about the relationship between virtues and values. The simplest distinction between 
virtues and values is that virtues are inherently good and universal, whereas values are 
culturally derived. Many people may value career progression and salary – but neither are 
virtues. Rather they are things we judge to have importance in our lives; they are values. 
Comparisons are also often drawn between virtue and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). However, CSR is characterized by an organizations continued commitment to ethical 
economic development as well as the development of their people, families, communities and 
society at large. In short, CSR is an organization’s obligations to society (Berger, 
Cunningham, & Drurmuright, 2007). Thus, a primary distinction between CSR and virtue is 
that CSR exists and is understood at the organizational level, manifest as systems, policies, 
and procedures, whereas virtue originates at the individual level, as an internal inclination 
towards good or excellence. There is also the inherency of virtue – it is good for its own sake 
– which distinguishes it from CSR, which is focused on instrumental outcomes for the 
organization and society.  
Similar to virtue, organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) tends to be 
operationalised at the individual level. OCB can be conceptualized as unenforceable 
discretionary individual behavior that contributes to the effective functioning of the 
organization and is not explicitly recognized by a rewards system (Organ, 1997). Or, more 
simply, “discretionary employee behaviors that are helpful but not absolutely required by 
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employers” (Dekas, Bauer, Welle, Kurkoski, & Sullivan, 2013, p. 219). OCB was initially 
conceptualized as consisting of five behavioral dimensions. However, over the years the 
number of dimensions expanded to 25, before being culled back to seven ‘grouped’ 
dimensions (Dekas et al., 2013). A concern highlight by Dekas et al (2013) is the implicit 
suggestion that the same set of behaviors will indicate OCB regardless of historical, 
demographic, cultural, or industry context. As we discuss in more detail in the following 
section, this issue is precisely why we propose factors for determining what is virtuous in a 
given context, rather than promoting a set list of virtues. The construct of OCB is also void of 
explicit reference to any moral philosophy, upon which and within which virtue is so deeply 
rooted. The fact that OCB is helpful to the organization echoes the idea of common good 
which is integral to the concept of virtue. However, there is a difference. The common good 
(virtue) is about the good of people as well as the organization; the common good is about a 
good polis, a good society, rather than just the good of the company. In comparison, the 
helpfulness of OCB may contribute to reaching key performance indicators or making budget 
but does not neccesarily contribute to the good of the individuals within the organization. 
Finally, the very name of the OCB concept, organizational citizenship behavior distinguishes 
OCB from virtue, which, as we have defined emerges from an internal inclination or intent 
towards good or excellence.   
A five factor framework for determining what is virtuous in which contexts 
As discussed earlier, Peterson and Seligman (2004) developed a catalogue of what they 
argued to be six universal virtues by applying strict criteria to a survey of the ancient texts of 
Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Ancient Greece, Judeo-Christianity, and Islam. The six 
universal virtues identified by Peterson and Seligman (2004) include: wisdom, courage, 
humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence.  The overall aim of Peterson and 
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Seligman’s (2004) classification was to provide an anti-thesis to the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, by developing a catalogue of wellness and those 
qualities (virtues) that ‘make life worth living’. Despite the comprehensiveness of Peterson 
and Seligman’s (2004) catalogue and extensive reference to it within the field of POI, debates 
about listing virtues continue, with numerous conflicting efforts to enumerate which are the 
virtues, or which virtues are most important within the organizational context (e.g. Solomon, 
1992; Wärnå-Furu et al., 2010), or leadership (e.g. Riggio, Zhu, Reina, & Maroosis, 2010; 
Sarros & Cooper, 2006; Sosik, Gentry, & Chun, 2012; Wang & Hackett, 2015).  
Instead of arguing for one list over another, we suggest that no list entirely or 
definitively enumerates which are ‘the’ virtues, nor which virtues are most important. Rather, 
we propose that what is virtuous is determined by five factors: intent or inclination, agent 
awareness, context, alignment with telos, and outcome. We argue that these factors can serve 
as a framework for determining what is virtuous in different contexts, which we suggest may 
be more practical and more contextually and culturally relevant than proposing one list of 
virtues – especially when we consider that expressions of virtue are experienced subjectively 
in the empirical domain. As illustrated in the layered ontology of virtue (Figure 1), those who 
experience virtuous behavioral events will make sense of them in a number of ways, 
including ascribing any number of virtues to same event, for example; where one sees 
honesty, another may see tact; or, where one sees wisdom another may see justice.  
Our intent in outlining factors for determining what is virtuous in which context is to 
enrich to our proposed virtues perspective. Specifically, we suggest that these factors provide 
a method for determining virtue and virtuousness in a way that is broader and more 
comprehensive than assessing for any singular virtue such as gratitude or compassion, as POI 
investigations frequently do. These factors are also more complete than ascribing 
virtuousness to any behavior seeming to fall between two opposed vices, as in a rough 
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application of the golden mean. In order to illustrate how the five factors for determining 
what is virtuous in which context relate to the three layered ontology we used to define virtue, 
we will integrate reference to our ontology in the discussion and example below. The five 
factors we propose build on the three conditions for virtue put forward by Sison and Ferrero 
(2015). Table 1 illustrates how each factor may be applied to a specific context.   
First, and as discussed above, virtue is deeper than an action or behavior. Virtue is an 
inherently good generative mechanism originating in the domain of the real (Figure 1). Virtue 
is an inclination or intent which gives rise to actions or events that express virtue subjectively 
interpreted as virtues such as such as courage, wisdom, or humour. Therefore, similar to  
Sison and Ferrero (2015), we propose that for a quality or action to be considered virtuous, it 
must arise from virtue as an inclination or disposition. Thus, this first factor is twofold; first, 
it stipulates that virtue originates as a generative mechanism in the domain of the real. Virtue 
generates feelings, thoughts, and actions that express moral excellence and contribute to the 
common good.  Beadle, Sison, and Fontrodona (2015) emphasise this point by suggesting that 
to ascribe virtue based only on observable behavior is to have failed to fully understand virtue. 
Second, virtues arise from an inclination towards virtue. . As Fineman (2006) explains,  
“doing things for their own sake, such as for love, wisdom, and self-fulfilment, is 
virtuous. Doing them for the social betterment or advantage of others is virtuous. 
Seeking personal reward or recompense for ones efforts, such as profit, power, or 
prestige, is not virtuous....Displays of compassion and courage are, therefore, void of 
virtue if they are performed simply for personal recognition or applause” (2006, p. 
272). 
The second factor in determining what is virtuous in which context is that an 
inclination towards virtue must acted upon knowingly. “[I]f we are to conclude that someone 
acted virtuously, we need to see not only what she did or said; we need to know how she saw 
what she was doing or saying” (Hughes, cited in Shotter & Tsoukas, 2014, p. 233). Virtuous 
behavior is guided by a knowing mind. Aristotle regarded prudence the primary virtue for its 
capacity to inform an individual how to employ the right virtue in the right way at the right 
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time, acknowledging that, with practice, virtuousness can become habituated (Aristotle, 
350BCE/1962). This second factor resides at the intersection of the real and actual domains 
(Figure 1). To satisfy the factor, an actor must be inclined by virtue (mechanism) and choose 
to act or speak accordingly and knowingly (event).  
The second factor relates closely to the third factor, which is the contextuality of 
virtues. Virtue must not only be acted upon knowingly, but also enacted in a way that is 
contextually appropriate. While the inherently good inclination of virtue may be universal, 
specific enactments of virtues are contextual, experienced in and responsive to culture and 
time. For instance, justice in ancient Rome looked much different to justice in modern Rome. 
The actual events (virtuous behaviors) that arise out of a virtuous inclination (real domain) 
vary according to temporal and cultural context, and must be enacted appropriately; “...virtue 
needs to account for character and context” (emphasis added, Bright et al., 2014, p. 445). 
Hence, the Roman tradition of crucifixion would not pass as justice in modern Italy. 
The fourth factor we propose for determining what is virtuous in which contexts is the 
concept of telos. Telos is our “point in living” (Barker, 2002, p. 1100); our raison d'être. 
Pursuing telos is what progresses us towards eudaimonia, or true and meaningful happiness 
(Barker, 2002).  “Each individual is born or socialized (and each organization founded) for 
the pursuit of a specific goal or telos. This telos holds the key to deciphering the relevant set 
of virtues an actor must possess...relevant virtues are therefore determined by the goals an 
actor means to pursue” (Heugens et al., 2008, p. 102). Thus, virtuous action must be aligned 
with the telos of the actor. How does the action propel him towards his higher purpose, his 
‘point in living’? We suggest that this fourth factor resides at the intersection of the real and 
actual domain, where the actor’s good intent (real domain) is knowingly acted upon (actual 
domain) in a way that aligns with his or her telos. 
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A final consideration when judging what is virtuous in which context is the issue of 
outcome. What actually happens as a result of the virtuous inclination which is knowingly 
enacted in a contextually appropriate way and in accordance with telos?  This factor resides 
in the domain of the empirical, how the virtuousness is experienced and made sense of by 
those present. Virtues represent “the most ennobling behaviors, and the essence of 
humankind when at its best” (Bright et al., 2014, p. 445). Is the outcome of the behavior 
ennobling? Does it uplift the actor and the acted upon in a way that contributes to the 
common good? Is the world, in however micro a frame, a better place for the actions 
generated by virtuous inclination?  
The factor of outcome (fifth factor) does not always align with the first factor of intent. 
Thus, although the intent may be good, the outcome may not always be ideal. For instance, 
when a bystander acts from good intent and jumps in the water to save a drowning man, the 
drowning man may still lose his life. A less than ideal outcome, despite good intent. However, 
if one considers the broader outcome; that the bystander acted on his virtue, that those 
witnessing the incident observed the event, and that loved ones of the drowned man know his 
rescue was at least attempted – it may still be classed as good (better, at least, than if the 
bystander had made no rescue effort) and thereby qualify as virtuous. A more mundane 
example highlights another aspect of the misalignment between intent and outcome. If 
someone’s good intention prompts an act of honesty, whereby he shares his true thoughts or 
feelings with another, but, does so in a way that lacks tact or kindness and therefore hurts 
another, then this hurtful outcome may counter his good intent.  
---------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------- 
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These five factors are not a mechanism for generating a list of virtues, nor are they 
synonymous with our deep ontology of virtue. Rather, by articulating these factors, we 
propose a framework (Table 1) which can be used by scholars and practitioners to determine 
for themselves what is virtuous, particularly within their organizational contexts. These five 
factors echo our ontology of virtue and  attempt to answer Suddaby’s (2010) call to provide 
sharp distinctions around the defined concept (virtue) so that it might be distilled as an 
understandable category. For a behavior or characteristic to fall into the category of virtue, 
we argue that it must satisfy the above factors. It must arise out of morally good inclination 
(in the real domain), be knowingly enacted (at the intersection of real and actual domains), 
contextually appropriate (in the actual domain), in accordance with telos (at the intersection 
of actual and empirical), and have an outcome that contributes to the common good or is 
ennobling for those involved (in the empirical domain). This does not tell us that loyalty is a 
virtue while faithfulness is not, and we suggest that the name given to the behavior or 
characteristic is less important than whether or not the behavior or characteristic satisfies the 
five factors articulated above. The reason being, the events that arise out of a virtuous 
inclination are experienced subjectively and may be labelled as any number of discrete 
virtues. 
Again, we draw on a scenario to illustrate our point. Consider the following; a project 
manager receives a bonus for a project completed on time and under budget. The bonus 
consists of a $300 gift voucher, which he uses to take his team out for lunch. Team member 
A sees this as a sign of loyalty; the manager has demonstrated loyalty to his team by sharing 
his reward with them. Team member B sees it as humility; a demonstration that the manager 
recognizes the expertise and input of the team. While the manager himself views it as fairness; 
he simply couldn’t have completed the project alone, and thus the reward belongs to the team.  
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The virtuous intent (factor 1) of the project manager gave rise to intentional actions 
(factor 2) which were contextually appropriate (factor 3) and in line with the manager’s telos 
(factor 4) of being a decent person and a good manager, and the outcome was a rewarding 
lunch and an uplifted team (factor 5). Thus, the event satisfies the five factors of virtuousness. 
However, each person involved in the event ascribed a different discrete virtue; one as loyalty, 
one as humility, and one as fairness. And the project manager’s actions could have been 
explained as any number of other specific virtues; generous, kind, just, respectful, honorable. 
The five factors we propose build upon our layered ontology and provide questions to 
help assess more comprehensively the virtue underpinning an action or event (as opposed to 
ascribing the ‘correct’ specific virtue). However, we put forth these factors with some caveats. 
The first caveat is our admittedly conventional western approach to AVE. Our efforts to 
advance the conceptualization of virtue within the field of POI will be enriched by future 
scholarship which might closely examine our suggested definition and five factor framework 
to assess its applicability or adaptability to other approaches. A second caveat is that factors 
that reside in or at the intersection of the domain of the real (factors 1, 2, and 4) are 
troublesome for anyone other than the actor to assess. For example, how can we say with 
certainty that another acted from pure intent? Or that his actions were in line with his unique 
telos? This may be a future avenue for investigation, but it is our understanding that only the 
actor himself, in this case the project manager, can know his true intent and the conscious 
alignment of his telos and action. However, those around him, his team members A and B, 
can have their own individual sense or judgment of the project manager’s intent and 
authenticity to telos. Thus, the application of factor 1 (good intent or inclination), factor 2 
(awareness), and factor 4 (telos) are applied based on the witness’s own subjective sense and 
judgment.  
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The simple example above, where a leader takes his team to lunch, provides a clear 
illustration of our five factor framework. However, we acknowledge that real organizational 
events are far more complex. As per the caveat above, a spectator may not correctly assume 
the intent, awareness, or telos of an actor. Therefore in response to a single scenario, 
spectator X may conclude it was virtuous, while spectator Y may disagree. For example, Gil 
was informed that the plant he managed would be closed in 12 months, at which point his 50 
employees would lose their jobs. Gil was asked by his senior executive team to keep this 
news confidential in order to avoid industrial action or community backlash. Gil tried to 
convince the executive team to inform employees of the impending closure and built a case to 
keep the plant open, but to no avail. Unwilling to deceive his employees, Gil leaked 
information to his staff of the impending closure.  
In this scenario, Gil broke confidentiality and loyalty to his senior executive in order 
to demonstrate loyalty and confidentiality to his employees. This tension between top 
management and managed employees is one commonly experienced by managers. As 
spectator X, we might conclude that Gil had acted on good intent by doing the ‘right thing’ 
by his employees (factor 1), and that he was aware of his actions including that they might 
result in union action or the termination of his own position (factor 2). We may also assess 
that Gil’s actions were in accord with the current economic climate in which mechanization 
and globalization continue to threaten the traditional manufacturing sector and plant workers 
such as Gil’s employees are commonly left unemployed, and thus contextually appropriate 
(factor 3). We might also ascribe Gil a telos to be an honest, decent person which he satisfied 
by telling the truth to his co-workers. And, finally, the outcome of Gil’s actions, while they 
did not prevent the closure of the plant did at least give employees fair warning. Thus, 
spectator X would likely conclude that Gil’s actions were virtuous within his given context.  
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However, we readily admit that spectator Y could ascribe Gil with a different telos, 
and might assume he acted from malice, such as with the intention to hurt the senior 
executive team rather than to help his employees. It could also be argued that Gil was 
unaware of if or how he was acting in accord with his intent. Any of these assumptions could 
lead spectator Y to conclude that Gil’s actions were not virtuous in this context.  
Providing this somewhat conflicting but more realistic example helps us illustrate two 
points. First, the person using our five factor framework for determining what is virtuous in 
which contexts will bare their own preconceptions, understandings, and judgements and two 
individuals might ascribe the same event in different ways. And secondly, in this article we 
have developed our five factor framework as a retrospective assessment tool, something to be 
used to consider the virtuousness (or not) of an event as an alternative to assessing for 
singular virtues such as honesty or compassion as is common within the field of POI. 
However, its true benefit might be in its potential to guide future action. How might Gil’s 
situation played out differently had his senior executive team used these five factors to guide 
their actions?  
Despite how or if future scholarship might apply or adapt our five factor framework, 
we maintain that it is more important to be able to determine whether an event or action 
arises from virtue, rather than to name the specific, ‘correct’ virtue associated with the event 
or action. The specific virtue ascribed to an event or behavior, comes, in part, from our own 
subjective perspective and may speak as much to the observer’s telos and intent as that of the 
actor. Hence, the reason team members A and B both regarded the project manager’s action 
as virtuous, but ascribed two different virtues. Our point is that the name we ascribe to a 
virtuous event is less important and more subjectively mediated than the factors identified 
above. Therefore, rather than prescribe a list of virtues, we propose the five factors of intent 
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or inclination, agent awareness, context, alignment with telos, and outcome for determining 
what is virtuous in which contexts.  
Implications and future research 
To advance virtue perspective argued in this paper, we need a clear conceptualization of what 
exactly virtue is. We have provided this by exploring a deep ontology of virtue, and 
proposing a five factor framework for determining what is virtuous in which context. A 
virtues perspective could be pursued by an array of future research within both AVE and POI. 
Within the more philosophic field of AVE future work may dig deeper into our ontology of 
virtue and five factor framework, or may review historical cases to assess how the framework 
overlays events deemed as virtuous or not, such as instances of whistleblowing or downsizing.  
Within the field of POI, future research may consider the possibilities of measuring 
virtue, and virtuousness, as distinct but also as more than the discrete virtues such as gratitude 
or compassion which have until now been the focus of POI assessment. Investigations of 
positive practice and other enablers of flourishing, thriving, and positive organizing (e.g. 
Burke, Page, & Cooper, 2015; Cameron, Mora, Leutscher, & Calarco, 2011; Cameron & 
Spreitzer, 2015; Spreitzer et al., 2012) might be reviewed in light of the clarity we have 
provided here to the notion of virtue. The emerging field of neuroethics possess interesting 
questions regarding moral enhancement (Shook, 2012), which may provide alternative 
avenues for understanding a virtue perspective as may the application of neuroscience and the 
proposed ‘engineering of virtue’ (Jotterand, 2011). We also urge a review of the virtue ethics 
literature in combination with the current organizational intervention literature to provide 
guidance on how best to select, refine, or develop virtue development interventions. 
Following which, empirical investigation could explore the process and outcomes of attempts 
to develop virtue in organizations. 
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Conclusion 
When we go to work, many of us look for more than just a pay-cheque. Increasingly, we seek 
purpose, meaning, and connection in the work we do, among the people we do it with, and 
within the organizations we do it for. Business is first and foremost a human practice 
(Solomon, 1993). The virtue perspective argued in this article might allow us to better 
understand the essence of our humanness; our virtue. A virtue perspective might allow us to 
account for more than cognition, emotion, and action – to capture the very essence of our 
humanness and how it might be activated to foster the sense of connection and meaning we 
desire in our workplace communities. We have laid the foundation for the advancement of 
virtue perspective by defining virtue as the human inclination to feel, think, and act in ways 
that express moral excellence and contribute to the common good; illustrating the deep 
ontology of this definition; discussing some key features of virtue; and articulating a five 
factors framework for determining what is virtuous in which contexts.  
In short, we hope that a virtue perspective, underpinned with the conceptual clarity 
provided in this article, might foster a cross-disciplinary approach to better understand the 
very essence of those human practices which underpin organizations. We call for future 
scholarship to adopt and advance a virtue perspective which might broaden the focus of 
management scholarship to include a more meaningful consideration of the very essence of 
our humanness. Aristotle taught that to live a great life, one must live in a great polis. Today, 
our workplace is our polis, and the wellbeing of the organization and its members are 
inextricably linked (Solomon, 1993). Virtue is the ‘goodness part’ of the individuals that 
compose organizations, and it is the linchpin that allows individuals to meaningful organize 
and form community. Better understanding virtue within organizations is key to providing the 
community and meaningful connection members so desire.  
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Figures and tables  
 
Figure 1 – the deep ontology of virtue 
Real domain 
generative mechanisms and 
structures which give rise to 
events 
 
 
Virtue 
an inclination towards good 
Actual domain 
observed and unobserved 
events 
 
 
 
Virtuous 
behaviors and 
characteristics arising 
from virtue 
Empirical domain 
subjective experiences of 
events 
 
 
 
Virtues 
subjective interpretation of 
virtuous behaviors and 
characteristics 
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Table 1 – Factors for determining what is virtuous in which contexts 
Does the actor seek recognition or reward for his or her 
feeling/thought/action?  
Does the feeling/thought/action arise out of intent towards moral 
excellence?   
Factor 1: intent/inclination 
   
How does the actor see his or her feeling/thought/action?  
Did the actor knowingly act in accordance with good intent?   
Factor 2: awareness  
Was the actor’s feeling/thought/action appropriate to his or her 
temporal and cultural context?   
Factor 3: contextual  
Does the feeling/thought/action align with the actor’s higher 
purpose?  
Does the feeling/thought/action move the actor closer to the 
person he or she wants to be?   
Factor 4: telos  
Is the outcome of the feeling/thought/action ennobling of the 
actor and the acted upon?  
Does the feeling/thought/action uplift the actor and the acted 
upon?  
Does the feeling/thought/action contribute to the common good?   
Factor 5:  Outcome   
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